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Unconditional optimality of Gaussian attacks against continuous-variable QKD
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A fully general approach to the security analysis of continuous-variable quantum key distribution
(CV-QKD) is presented. Provided that the quantum channel is estimated via the covariance matrix
of the quadratures, Gaussian attacks are shown to be optimal against all eavesdropping strategies,
including collective and coherent attacks. The proof is made strikingly simple by combining a phys-
ical model of measurement, an entanglement-based description of CV-QKD, and a recent powerful
result on the extremality of Gaussian states [Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 080502 (2006)].
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c, 42.50.-p
Continuous-variables quantum information [1] has at-
tracted a rapidly increasing interest over the past few
years. Several QKD schemes based on a Gaussian mod-
ulation of coherent states of light combined with homo-
dyne or heterodyne detection have been proposed [2, 3]
and experimentally demonstrated [4, 5]. These protocols
have the advantage of being based on standard optical
telecom components and thereby of working at high rep-
etition rates compared to the schemes based on single-
photon detectors. The first security proof of CV-QKD
was restricted to Gaussian individuals attacks [2, 3, 4, 6].
In such an attack, the eavesdropper (Eve) is assumed to
interact individually - according to a Gaussian map - with
each of the signal pulses sent over the line, and then to
perform a Gaussian (homodyne or heterodyne) measure-
ment on her probe after the basis information (if any)
is disclosed but before the full classical post-processing.
Later on, it was shown that non-Gaussian individual at-
tacks cannot beat Gaussian attacks [7], so that studying
the security against Gaussian individual attacks is quite
justified. This proof extends to the case where Eve at-
tacks finite-size blocks of pulses, but does not cover the
important class of collective attacks, where Eve jointly
measures all her probes (each having interacted with a
signal pulse) after the classical post-processing has taken
place [8, 9, 10]. The security versus Gaussian collective
attacks was recently studied in [11, 12], but a definitive
proof of the optimality of Gaussian attacks was missing.
In this Letter, we prove that the optimal collective
attack reduces to a Gaussian attack that is completely
characterized by the covariance matrix of the quadra-
tures observed by the emitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob).
This optimality is probably even stronger in view of the
recent result that the most general attacks, namely co-
herent attacks (where Eve coherently interacts with all
signal pulses and performs a joint measurement after the
classical post-processing), cannot outperform collective
attacks [8, 9], implying that it is sufficient to check the
security of QKD against collective attacks.
One-way QKD protocols with Gaussian continuous
variables are divided in two steps, a quantum commu-
nication part followed by a classical post-processing. In
the quantum part, Alice sends either a displaced squeezed
state encoding a random Gaussian variable or a coher-
ent state encoding two Gaussian variables. Then, Bob
performs either homodyne (active basis-choice) or het-
erodyne measurement (no basis-choice) on the received
states (not necessarily Gaussian) in order to decode Al-
ice’s variable. Once Alice and Bob have collected a suf-
ficiently large list of correlated data, they proceed with
the classical post-processing. Unless Alice sent coherent
states and Bob did heterodyne measurement, they first
apply a sifting, where they compare the chosen encoding
and measurement quadratures (x or p) and keep only the
values for which the quadratures match. Then, they ap-
ply parameter estimation, i.e., they calculate the covari-
ance matrix γAB of their correlated variables from a ran-
domly chosen sample of their data. The optimal attack
being Gaussian (as we will prove below), γAB completely
characterizes the channel as the first-order moments of
the quadratures do not play any role. Finally, they ap-
ply one-way error correction and privacy amplification to
distill a secret key. The error correction can be done in
two ways: either direct reconciliation (DR), where Bob
corrects his data to Alice’s ones, or reverse reconciliation
(RR), where Alice’s and Bob’s roles are interchanged [4].
Physical model of measurement. Assume Alice and
Bob share a quantum state ρAB and Alice then makes
a von Neumann measurement on system A, obtaining
the outcome a distributed according to the probability
distribution p(a). This measurement can be realized by
applying an appropriate unitary operation UA on A to-
gether with an ancilla, and subsequently observing the
state of this ancilla while tracing over the resulting quan-
tum system A′ (see Fig. 1). Considering the ancilla as a
physical system, noted as a after the action of UA, the
joint state of a and B after the measurement is
ρaB =
∫
da p(a)|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρaB. (1)
Given the block-diagonal structure of ρaB, the quantum
mutual entropy S(a:B) can be shown to coincide with the
Holevo bound χaB = S(ρB)−
∫
da p(a)S(ρaB) [13]. Note
that the situation here is fully equivalent to that where
a is a classical preparer and B is a quantum preparation.
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FIG. 1: Alice’s measurement of system A of the bipartite state
ρAB, giving the result a. Equivalently, a denotes the internal
state of a preparer who prepares system B according to a.
Now, assume Bob measures his system B by means of
the unitary UB in a similar way as Alice. The resulting
joint state is given by the diagonal density operator,
ρab =
∫
da db p(a, b)|a〉〈a| ⊗ |b〉〈b|. (2)
The quantum mutual entropy S(a:b) then simply re-
duces to the Shannon mutual information Iab between
the preparer’s and the measurer’s internal states. The
Holevo bound on the accessible information then becomes
a straightforward consequence of the strong subadditivity
of von Neumann entropies, namely [13]
Iab = S(a:b) ≤ S(a:bB′) = S(a:B) = χaB. (3)
Entanglement-based version of CV-QKD. The descrip-
tion of any prepare-and-measure CV-QKD protocol us-
ing its equivalent entanglement-based scheme is very con-
venient for security analyses [14]. Indeed, all protocols
based on the Gaussian modulation of Gaussian states
and homodyne (or heterodyne) measurement can be de-
scribed in a unified way, see Fig. 2. Alice and Bob are
assumed to share a bipartite quantum state ρAB, whose
purification is given to Eve. Alice’s measurement of A is
equivalent to a preparation scheme where she randomly
chooses a, according to p(a), and sends the state ρaB0 in
the quantum channel so that Bob receives the state ρaB
at the output. The unitary UA determines which mea-
surement is performed: homodyne measurements, corre-
sponding to the preparation of squeezed states, or het-
erodyne measurements, corresponding to the preparation
of coherent states (a then collectively denotes two real
numbers). The maximal information that is accessible to
Bob is given, in principle, by χaB = S(a:B). In prac-
tice, however, Bob applies an homodyne (or heterodyne)
measurement on B, giving b, so the actually extracted
information is Iab = S(a:b). Since there are two possible
encodings at Alice’s station and two possible measure-
ments at Bob’s station, there exist four Gaussian proto-
cols (three of them having been described in [2, 3, 6]).
Consider now that Eve performs a collective attack:
she interacts individually with each signal pulse sent by
Alice, stores her resulting probes in a quantum memory,
and then applies a joint measurement over them at the
end of the classical post-processing. As shown in [8, 9],
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FIG. 2: Entanglement-based scheme for CV-QKD. Alice’s
preparation is modelled by a measurement UA on her half
of an EPR pair. The channel is modelled by an unitary inter-
action between mode B and Eve ancilla’s E. Finally, Bob’s
measurement is modelled by UB .
her information is then limited by the Holevo bound
χaE = S(ρE) −
∫
da p(a)S(ρaE). Because Eve holds the
purification of ρAB, this bound can be calculated from
ρAB: for example, when Alice and Bob apply the same
measurement, it reads χaE = S(ρAB) −
∫
da p(a)S(ρaB).
If ρAB is assumed to be Gaussian, then χaE can be di-
rectly computed from γAB [11, 12].
Extremality of Gaussian states. To prove the optimal-
ity of Gaussian collective attacks, we also need a very
useful theorem, recently proven in [15]. Let us sketch it
here for bipartite states ρAB that have zero first-order
moments. Let f be a function satisfying the properties
1. continuity in trace norm: if ‖ρ(n)AB−ρAB‖1→ 0 when
n→∞, then f(ρ(n)AB)→ f(ρAB),
2. invariance under local “Gaussification” unitaries:
f(U †G ⊗ U †G ρ⊗NAB UG ⊗ UG) = f(ρ⊗NAB ),
3. strong super-additivity: f(ρA1...NB1...N ) ≥
f(ρA1B1) + ... + f(ρANBN ) with equality if
ρA1...NB1...N = ρA1B1 ⊗ ...⊗ ρANBN .
Then, for every bipartite state ρAB with covariance ma-
trix γAB, we have that
f(ρAB) ≥ f(ρGAB) (4)
where ρGAB is the Gaussian state with the same γAB. The
proof can be summarized by
f(ρAB)
3
=
1
N
f(ρ⊗NAB )
2
=
1
N
f(ρ˜A1...NB1...N )
3≥ 1
N
N∑
k=1
f(ρ˜AkBk)
1,⋆≃ f(ρGAB) (5)
where the superscripts label the assumptions used in each
step, while ρ˜A1...NB1...N ≡ U †G ⊗ U †G ρ⊗NAB UG ⊗ UG. The
⋆ stands for the use of a central limit result for quantum
states (see [15] for details). The Gaussification unitary
UG is a passive operation, which can be realized with
a network of beam splitters and phase shifters. Impor-
tantly for what follows, the x and p quadratures of all N
modes are thus not mixed via Gaussification.
Optimality of Gaussian attacks. The core of our proof
now consists in combining this extremality result with the
3entanglement-based version of CV-QKD supplemented
with our physical model of measurement. In realistic pro-
tocols, Alice and Bob do not achieve the Holevo bound,
but only extract the mutual information Iab = S(a:b). In
contrast, Eve is assumed to have no technological limita-
tion, so, by collective attacks, she can attain the Holevo
bound χaE = S(a:E). Then, using our notation, the
achievable DR secret key rate reads [8, 9],
K(ρAB) = S(a:b)− S(a:E) = S(a|E)− S(a|b). (6)
The function K(ρAB) depends on the choice of the mea-
surement done by Alice and Bob (and on the sifting if
any), but does not depend on the purification of ρAB.
We now will prove that K(ρAB) satisfies the three condi-
tions of the Gaussian extremality theorem. For this, we
also need to use the extension of this function over 2N
modes (A¯ = A1...N , B¯ = B1...N), namely
K(ρA¯B¯) = S(a¯:b¯)− S(a¯:E) = S(a¯|E)− S(a¯|b¯). (7)
where Alice (Bob) do the same measurement on her (his)
N modes, and Eve has the purification of ρA¯B¯. Note that
Eq. (7) restricts to Eq. (6) when N = 1.
i) Continuity: If ‖ρ(n)
A¯B¯
− ρA¯B¯‖1≤ ǫ, using Ulhmann’s
theorem and well-known relations between the fidelity
and trace distance [16], we can find a purification |Ψ〉(n)
A¯B¯E
(|Ψ〉A¯B¯E) of ρ(n)A¯B¯ (ρA¯B¯) such that ‖Ψˆ
(n)
A¯B¯E
− ΨˆA¯B¯E ‖1≤
2
√
ǫ. Then, considering that partial trace can only de-
crease the trace norm [16], we have ‖ρ(n)a¯E − ρa¯E‖1≤ 2
√
ǫ
and ‖ρ(n)
a¯b¯
− ρa¯b¯‖1≤ 2
√
ǫ. Finally, the continuity of von
Neumann entropies implies the continuity of K. 
ii) Invariance under local Gaussification unitaries:
Applying the local Gaussification operation UG ⊗ UG on
the product states |ψ〉⊗NABE (as shown in Fig. 3 forN = 2),
we obtain the state |ψ˜〉A¯B¯E¯ . After the measurements on
Alice’s and Bob’s sides, the state becomes ρ˜a¯b¯E¯ . But be-
cause the (homodyne or heterodyne) measurement and
the Gaussification operation can be interchanged, by ap-
plying U †G ⊗ U †G on modes a¯ and b¯ we recover the state
ρ⊗NabE , which coincides with the state obtained by directly
measuring |ψ〉⊗NABE without Gaussification. Since the two
states ρ˜a¯b¯ and ρ
⊗N
ab are related by a local unitary op-
eration U †G ⊗ U †G and since the mutual von Neumann
entropies appearing in K(ρAB) are invariant under (any)
local unitaries, we obtain the invariance ofK(ρAB) under
local Gaussification unitaries. 
iii) Strong super-additivity: We will restrict the proof
to two modes on each side, A1,2 and B1,2, the general-
ization to N > 2 being straightforward. We have
K(ρA1,2B1,2) = S(a1a2|E)− S(a1a2|b1b2) (8)
where the conditional entropies can be expressed as
S(a1a2|E) = S(a1|a2E) + S(a2|a1E) + S(a1:b2|E)
S(a1a2|b1b2) = S(a1|b1b2) + S(a2|b1b2)− S(a1:a2|b1b2)
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FIG. 3: Invariance under local “Gaussification” unitaries: UG
can be interchanged with the measurement UA, then U
−1
G
and
UG cancel each other.
As a consequence of the strong sub-additivity of von Neu-
mann entropies, we obtain the bound
K ≥ S(a1|a2E)− S(a1|b1b2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥S(a1|A2B2E)−S(a1|b1)
+S(a2|a1E)− S(a2|b1b2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥S(a2|A1B1E)−S(a2|b2)
(9)
(using the fact that conditioning can only decrease the
conditional entropy). The purification of A1B1 (A2B2)
being A2B2E (A1B1E), we obtain
K(ρA1,2B1,2) ≥ K(ρA1B1) +K(ρA2B2). (10)
The additivity of K(ρA1,2B1,2) is a straightforward con-
sequence of the additivity of von Neumann entropies. 
Thus, using Eq. (4), we have proved that for all bi-
partite quantum states ρAB with covariance matrix γAB,
one has K(ρAB) ≥ K(ρGAB). This means that K(ρGAB)
is a lower bound on the secret key rate for any proto-
col (even non-Gaussian) and collective attack (includ-
ing non-Gaussian). The only requirement for this result
to hold is that Alice and Bob use the second-order mo-
ments of the quadratures in order to calculate this bound.
In particular, for the Gaussian-modulation protocols of
[2, 3, 4, 6], Eve’s optimal attack is a Gaussian attack, in
which case the bound is saturated. Note that the above
proof concerns DR, see Eq. (6), but its extension to RR is
straightforward: one simply needs to interchange a ↔ b
and A↔ B. As an illustration, Fig. 4 shows the highest
tolerable excess noise ǫ as a function of the line transmis-
sion T for the four Gaussian protocols (in DR and RR)
and the optimal Gaussian collective attack.
Coherent attacks represent the most powerful class of
attacks Eve can perform: she let all the signal pulses sent
by Alice interact with a large auxiliary system (quantum
computer), which she measures jointly at the end of the
classical post-processing. Recently, it has been shown
(for discrete-variable QKD) that, under some symmetries
of the classical post-processing, the collective attacks are
actually as efficient for Eve as the coherent attacks [8,
9]. Taking for granted that this proof extends to CV-
QKD, we conclude that our optimality proof of Gaussian
attacks holds in full generality.
Realistic implementations of CV-QKD never achieve
the secret key rate K(ρAB) because reconciliation proto-
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FIG. 4: Tolerable excess noise ǫ as a function of the chan-
nel transmission T at the limit of an infinite modulation for
the four Gaussian protocols: squeezed states + homodyne
measurement (solid line), squeezed states + heterodyne mea-
surement (dashed line), coherent states + homodyne mea-
surement (dotted line), and coherent states + heterodyne
measurement (dot-dashed line). The curves vanishing at (or
above) T = 0.5 correspond to DR, whereas those vanishing
at T = 0 refer to RR.
cols are not 100% efficient. The actual key rate is
K = βS(a:b)−S(a:E) = S(a|E)−βS(a|b)− (1−β)S(a).
(11)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency. It is easy
to prove that Eq. (11) also satisfies the three conditions
of the extremality theorem, so our conclusions remain
unchanged. In the special case of β = 0, this means that
Eve’s accessible information χaE = S(a:E) is maximized
for Gaussian states, so that Gaussian collective attacks
are also optimal in this restricted sense.
“Quantum” Bob. A theoretically interesting – though
probably unrealistic – situation is the case where Bob
reaches the Holevo bound χaB. This may be done by
combining the use of quantum memory with a proper
optimal post-processing at Bob’s side. The “ultimate”
available secret key rate then reads
K = S(a:B)− S(a:E) = S(a|E)− S(a|B) (12)
It again satisfies the three above conditions, so it is lower
bounded by the Gaussian attack.
Conclusion. We have presented a unified analysis of all
known QKD protocols based on Gaussian modulation of
coherent (or squeezed) states by Alice and homodyne (or
heterodyne) detection by Bob, for the DR and RR ver-
sions of one-way reconcilation. This entanglement-based
model of CV-QKD combined with a physical representa-
tion of measurement gives a very simple way of writing
the secret key rates in terms of mutual von Neumann
entropies involving quantum systems (including the pre-
parer and the measurer). Then, exploiting a recent result
on the extremality of Gaussian states, we have demon-
strated that the optimal collective attack against all these
protocols is a Gaussian operation. It is then sufficient to
check the security against Gaussian attacks, which are
completely characterized by the covariance matrix γAB
estimated by Alice and Bob. This result appears to be
quite general as it holds for realistic protocols (with fi-
nite reconciliation efficiency) as well as for ideal protocols
(where Bob has a quantum memory and extracts the en-
tire accessible information). Provided that [8] can be
adapted to CV, it even extends to the full unconditional
security of CV-QKD against coherent attacks.
Note added: The optimality of Gaussian collective at-
tacks has been independently proved using different tech-
niques in [17].
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